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Abstract 
The lack of information sharing among law enforcement agencies leading up to the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks has been well documented.  An emphasis on interaction among law 
enforcement agencies with other government and private sector organizations has been 
reinforced in contemporary counter-terrorism efforts.  Despite this emphasis, very little is known 
with respect to which law enforcement agencies are collaborating with which public works and 
private sector organizations to fulfill this critical mission gap.  The present research utilizes two 
federally-funded national surveys to explore the collaborative relationships between law 
enforcement, other government organizations, and private sector organizations.  Findings suggest 
collaboration across sectors exists, however it appears significant room for improvement 
remains.   
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“[B]ut the truth of the matter is, nobody bats 1,000, and I think as a nation we need to come to 
terms with it and do everything we can to prevent it, but also recognize that fusion centers and 
intelligence…are part of our future.” 
- Boston Police Commissioner Edward Davis, 
Testifying before the House Committee on Homeland Security, May 9, 2013 
  
 
Inter-Organizational Relationships among Law Enforcement 
 Organizations develop external relationships for a host of reasons, ranging from political 
to resourceful to tactical.  For context of the current discussion, law enforcement utilizes 
relationships with external organizations as a tactical means to achieve desired ends; to prevent 
and mitigate threats of terrorism and crime.  Such external organizations included (but are not 
limited to) public health, private security, and transportation organizations as well as multiple 
federal entities.  In August 2011, the White House published a document titled Empowering 
Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States that specifically outlined the 
need to develop and sustain relationships across all sectors within U.S. communities to prevent 
acts of terrorism.  Specifically, this initiative identified the need for government to: 
…not narrowly build relationships around national security issues alone…there are 
instances when the government needs to build new relationships to address security 
issues, but these must be predicated upon multifaceted engagement…local, state, and 
tribal governments; prison officials; and law enforcement must receive intelligence based 
on, research, and accurate information…(5-6) 
 
These partnerships are at the heart of successful information sharing for law enforcement 
intelligence and threat prevention; whether the threat is terrorism, extremism, crime, health 
epidemic, or natural disaster.  It is important to note that national security intelligence and law 
enforcement intelligence vary in concept and practice.  The current research focuses on law 
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enforcement intelligence as it relates to terrorism, threats, and crimes.  National security 
intelligence is not interchangeable within the context provided here.2  More specifically, the 
present research focuses on law enforcement information sharing relationships post September 
11, 2001 (hereafter 9/11) as this was arguably the transformational point in law enforcement 
intelligence practices.   
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (2004) presented their findings in what is known as the “9/11 
Commission Report.”  In sum, this report concluded that information sharing failures were 
ubiquitous across all levels of law enforcement leading up to the attacks.  A litany of initiatives 
was taken in response to the recommendations outlined in the report; two of which are central to 
the current discussion.  First, in building the homeland security enterprise, the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security created what are known as fusion centers to facilitate the sharing of 
information and intelligence across jurisdictions and sectors.  Second, state and local law 
enforcement were expected to participate in this new information sharing environment.  Their 
role was to actively collect, analyze, and disseminate information and intelligence.  
Unfortunately, no valid metrics are readily available to assess where law enforcement was with 
regard to information sharing prior to 9/11; nor do such metrics exist currently at the state and 
local law enforcement agency level.    
Based on reports published by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2011) and the 
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security (2013), law enforcement is in a 
more advantageous and operationally effective position today, with regards to information 
sharing, as compared to pre-9/11.  Based on the subjectivity of this progress (see U.S. Senate, 
2012) and the metrics used, more specific information regarding information sharing practices 
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among state and local law enforcement is sorely needed to establish a reliable evidence base for 
drawing conclusions about what progress has or has not occurred.  Unfortunately, there is no 
baseline data from before 9/11 to compare the metrics presented in this research.    
In conjunction with these reports, the extant literature is beginning to understand the 
philosophy and operations of law enforcement intelligence; however gaps remain related to these 
relationships.  This research seeks to inform this gap.  The findings to follow are not intended to 
be a parsimonious test of theory.  The knowledge base regarding law enforcement intelligence 
generally, and law enforcement relationships for information sharing more specifically, is 
dramatically uninformed.  Empirical information to date regarding such relationships has been 
drawn from two individual states – South Carolina (Cooney et al. 2011) and New Jersey 
(Ratcliffe and Walden 2010).  Findings presented here are intended to shed light into the black 
box of law enforcement information sharing relationships post 9/11.   
 
Information Sharing 
The philosophy through which information sharing and intelligence fit into state and local 
law enforcement is intelligence-led policing.  While there is no universally accepted definition of 
intelligence-led policing, the following definition perhaps best illustrates the conceptualization of 
the philosophy: 
The collection and analysis of information related to crime and conditions that contribute 
to crime, resulting in an actionable intelligence product intended to aid law enforcement 
in developing tactical responses to threats and/or strategic planning related to emerging or 
changing threats (Carter and Carter 2009a, 317).  
 
The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan posits all agencies, regardless of size, must 
have an intelligence-led policing capability (Global Intelligence Working Group 2003) yet there 
is no common denominator as to what an intelligence-led policing capability constitutes for 
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agencies of different size and responsibility.  Intuition would assert that a larger police agency 
should have a more comprehensive intelligence capacity than a smaller agency (i.e. more 
resources and a demand to develop this capability).  While this is an appropriate assumption, it is 
not appropriate to automatically consider a small police agency’s “basic” intelligence-led 
capability as being insufficient.  An agency’s intelligence-led policing capability need only be as 
advanced as the responsibilities that agency requires.  For most local agencies in the U.S., the 
most important component of intelligence-led policing is having established relationships with 
external organizations and the community they serve; whether they are formal or informal.   
 This approach is well tailored as a tool to combat terrorism (McGarrell, Chermak, and 
Freilich 2007) as well as street crimes that represent the majority of state and local law 
enforcement responsibilities (Darroch and Mazerolle 2013; Ratcliffe 2008).  In order to be 
successful, intelligence-led policing depends on strong relationships with citizens, businesses, 
and organizations that comprise the communities they protect.  Threats of terrorism and crime 
will continue to be a critical responsibility for the police as will the need for community support. 
Moreover, with increased social tension as a result of homeland security and counter-terrorism 
initiatives (Moynihan 2005), the need is even greater to maintain a close, interactive dialogue 
between law enforcement and the community.  This is best achieved through established 
community policing skills in many law enforcement officers that directly support intelligence-led 
policing responsibilities (Carter and Carter 2009a).  Such skills include problem solving, 
environmental scanning, effective communications with the public, fear reduction, and 
community mobilization to deal with problems (Haarr 2001).   
Preliminary research indicates the most effective method for law enforcement to achieve 
active relationships across external organizations is to establish an information liaison officer 
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program (U.S. House of Representatives 2013).  Based on the National Response Framework 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2008), Fusion Center Guidelines (Global Intelligence 
Working Group 2005) and Baseline Capabilities for Fusion Centers (Global Intelligence 
Working Group 2008), these programs – at a minimum – should include relationships with fire, 
emergency medical, public health, and the private sectors.  In the most basic programs, 
intelligence liaison officers serve as a point of contact to collect and disseminate information and 
products to and from the community.  Intelligence-led policing is the programmatic function by 
which information sharing fits at the agency-level fits into the greater law enforcement 
intelligence landscape.  The effectiveness of intelligence-led policing is enhanced through the 
utilization of a contemporary addition to the policing infrastructure post-9/11; information 
sharing facilities known as “fusion centers.”  
 
Fusion Centers  
Every state in the U.S., as well as Puerto Rico, has at least one official fusion center 
while many states have multiple centers (U.S. House of Representatives 2013).  These centers 
are designed to increase the exchange of information and data across government and private 
sectors to enhance law enforcement’s ability to fight crime and terrorism and prevent threats 
(Global Intelligence Working Group 2005).  From an infrastructure perspective, fusion centers 
are perhaps the most salient difference between pre- and post-9/11 policing.  Each center is a 
composition of multiple organizations across law enforcement, public works, and the private 
sector.  Diversification of the personnel that comprise these centers is believed to enhance 
information flow to and from the streets (Carter and Carter 2009b).  The relationship between 
intelligence-led policing and fusion centers is reinforced by the National Strategy for Homeland 
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Security that identifies the intelligence-led policing philosophy and fusion center capabilities as 
the primary tools to combat terrorism and threats to the U.S (Homeland Security Council 2006).   
There is no single model for a fusion center, namely because of the diverse needs and 
environmental characteristics that affect the structure, processes, and products of such a center.  
A Congressional Research Service report notes that in light of the growth of the fusion centers in 
state and local jurisdictions without a coordinated national plan, “there appears to be no ‘one-
size-fits-all’ structural or operational model for fusion centers” (Rollins 2008, 18).  Though there 
is debate regarding the efficacy of fusion centers and their optimal model for success (Taylor and 
Russell 2012), the most effective model is likely one driven by local law enforcement needs.  As 
noted by Johnson and Dorn (2008, 38) in describing the New York State Intelligence Center, 
“Creating one center for intelligence and terrorism information, to combine and distribute 
that information to law enforcement agencies statewide, prevents duplication of effort by 
multiple agencies. Additionally, one state fusion center serving the entire New York law 
enforcement community provides a comprehensive picture of criminal and terrorists 
networks, aids in the fight against future terrorists events and reduces crime.” 
 
Preparedness 
At the outset, care must be given to the conceptual underpinning of what preparedness 
relationships are intended to provide in the law enforcement context.  Unlike relationships with 
federal and state organizations, preparedness relationships are a function for disaster 
management, response, and mitigation.  These relationships are obviously not independent of 
sharing information for purposes of counter-terrorism, threats, and crimes, but are more 
planning-oriented than threat-oriented.  Law enforcement interact with emergency management, 
public health, transportation, critical infrastructure, fire, and public works organizations to 
primarily develop response plans.  Throughout this process, relationships are established that can 
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lead to information sharing for other purposes – such as fire department personnel reaching out 
to police personnel to alert them of suspicious activity.   
 
Private Sector and Public Health  
The Program Manager’s Information Sharing Environment (2006) observed that the 
private sector can be a rich resource of information, which adds a broadened dimension to 
information collection.  Many large corporations have sophisticated security operations that 
monitor global threats to their facilities, products, and personnel, as posed by organized crime, 
criminal extremists, and predatory criminals (National Infrastructure Advisory Council 2008).  
This type of information is often different from that collected by law enforcement organizations, 
and it can add a unique, more insightful component to the body of information being analyzed by 
the fusion center.  Similarly, the private sector is a legitimate consumer of law enforcement 
intelligence, meeting the “right to know” and “need to know” information-sharing standards.  
For example, the private sector owns 85% of the critical infrastructure in the United States 
(Homeland Security Advisory Council 2006).  Moreover, the private sector has a large personnel 
force that, if given the proper training, can significantly increase the eyes and ears on the street to 
observe and report suspicious activity.  As noted in one of the best practices papers produced by 
the Department of Homeland Security, a jurisdiction’s analysis entity, such as a fusion center, 
should establish processes for sharing information with the local private sector (Lessons Learned 
Information Sharing 2005).    
State and local law enforcement’s role in public health has largely pertained to 
preparedness and emergency response.  Following the National Response Framework published 
by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2008), in the event of an emergency incident, 
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local law enforcement serves as the initial response mechanism in a multi-layered response 
approach.  A department’s ability to respond effectively to any emergency - public health or 
otherwise - greatly depends on its preparedness which relies on the law enforcement agency’s 
strategic planning and its partnerships.  The emphasis on strategic planning and partnerships is 
the dimension of law enforcement’s role in public health that has recently begun to evolve.  
Rather than operationalizing planning and partnerships as a means to solely improve first-
responding, law enforcement has begun efforts to identify proactive measures via public health 
information sharing; such as collaboration between biological detecting systems and fusion 
centers (Carter and Rip 2013).   
The Police Executive Research Forum published a series of guides to help improve the 
law enforcement response to public health emergencies.  In short, these guides emphasized the 
importance of law enforcement communication with public health organizations, other public 
safety agencies, and the community (Brito, Luna, and Sanberg 2009) and strategic planning for 
the prevention and mitigation of public health events (Sanberg et al. 2010).  Such 
communication is achieved through partnerships and liaison officer programs.  Local law 
enforcement serves as a force-multiplier with respect to information collection.  Primarily 
through community policing, police officers are able to gather raw information and recognize 
indicators and warnings of threats – a somewhat grass-roots level of epidemiological 
surveillance.  This micro-level information is critical to identifying accurate threat pictures and is 
relied upon by fusion centers and thus public health organizations as well.   
Integrating private and public health organizations into the law enforcement information 
sharing and intelligence arena is not without its obstacles.  In terms of private organizations, 
certain types of personal information may be inappropriate for law enforcement to release to the 
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private sector.  Similarly, the private sector is concerned that proprietary information related to 
corporate products may be inappropriately released or requested during due process.  With 
respect to public health, officials are hesitant to share information as it may violate Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability privacy laws.  Despite these limitations and concerns, 
there exists a legitimate role for the private sector and public health in the information sharing 
environment.   
 
Research Design and Methods 
 The present study utilizes two national surveys of information sharing practices that were 
conducted with two different samples of key personnel.  These surveys were part of a larger 
research project funded by the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice3.  The 
first survey sample consisted of state and local law enforcement personnel tasked to develop and 
sustain an intelligence capacity for their individual agencies.  The second sample consisted of 
personnel from regional and state fusion centers that serve as the key component in their state 
and major urban area intelligence infrastructures.  Both sets of data are unique from the 
perspective that they represent information contained by a relatively small sample of specific law 
enforcement personnel; those persons that work in the intelligence and information sharing 
function of their agency.   
 
Data 
The sample of law enforcement personnel included individuals who had attended a 
national training program4 funded by the Department of Homeland Security.  This sampling 
strategy was chosen for multiple reasons.  By attending this training, these personnel were 
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identified by their respective agency as a representative of the intelligence function within the 
agency.  These persons are also most likely to be the personnel who have direct knowledge and a 
working understanding of key issues related to intelligence and information sharing – thus they 
are most knowledgeable about the practices of interest.  Empirical research exploring law 
enforcement intelligence issues has been severely hampered by a lack of access to, and 
unwillingness to participate by, intelligence personnel within agencies (see Chermak et al. 2013).  
Moreover, ideal surveying methods – such as random sampling – are not feasible given the 
fidelity of intelligence practices nationwide.  Not every law enforcement agency in the country is 
actively engaged in information sharing and intelligence practices (Carter and Phillips 2013), 
thus a targeted sample is required.   
Virtually all intelligence research to date (post-9/11) has been conducted based on 
purposive samples where the researchers had an existing relationship with the intelligence 
personnel (see Cooney et al. 2011; Cope 2004; Darroch and Mazerolle 2013; Graphia-Joyal 
2010; Ratcliffe and Walden 2010; Ratcliffe, Strang, and Taylor 2014).  Despite scholars not 
having an interest in classified information, the presence of security measures to safeguard 
classified information is believed to inhibit a willingness to share even the most basic of 
information regarding law enforcement intelligence practices. As a result, data extraction for 
research purposes relies on a rapport between researchers and intelligence practitioners.  Such an 
approach is commonplace in other aspects of policing where information is sensitive, such as 
policing cybercrime (Holt and Bossler 2012) and sex workers (Simic et al. 2006).   
The second sample group was comprised of persons who attended the 2007 and 2008 
National Fusion Center Conferences (NFCC).5 The NFCC is sponsored by leading law 
enforcement intelligence organizations and is considered to be the prominent gathering of key 
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personnel from each fusion center in the United States.  Attendees of the NFCC include fusion 
center directors, operational personnel, and intelligence analysts.  This decision to survey 
participants at these conferences rather than sending surveys directly to fusion centers was made 
since the NFCC provides a concentration of key fusion center personnel – such as administrators, 
managers, and analysts – who are more likely and appropriate to complete a survey regarding 
intelligence practices as opposed to sending the survey to the center in general fashion.   
This research utilized web-based surveys.  Within the law enforcement sample, e-mail 
invitations were sent to 2,025 people and 414 replies were received (20.4% response rate).  A 
portion of these replies were not included in the analysis that follows because a respondent either 
left all survey cells blank or responded with not applicable.  A total of 345 responses are 
included in the findings.  With respect to the fusion center sample, 772 email invitations were 
sent and 96 completed surveys were returned (12.4% response rate).  The sampling frames were 
adjusted as respondents replied to the surveys or asked to be removed from the list.   
The response rates for the surveys were less than expected.  Such response rates are not 
surprising given online-based surveys yield lower response rates than do traditional mail or in-
person surveys (Shih and Fan 2009), that cross-sectional response rates in social sciences are 
declining (Brick and Williams 2013), and the exploratory nature of the research within an area of 
law enforcement commonly believed to be a difficult one to sample as previously noted.  Follow-
up phone interviews were conducted with 100 randomly selected persons from the sample to 
gauge reasons for low response rates.  Three factors were identified: 1) Survey length; 2) Jobs 
responsibilities and; 3) Security concerns. More information about these follow-up interviews 
can be provided by the author upon request.  Due to an inability to detect the nature of the 
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response bias, and since there is no national data related to intelligence for comparison, the 
results presented should be accepted with caution.   
Though these response rates are lower than one would hope, it is believed the samples are 
valid; especially when exploring a widely under-researched aspect of law enforcement inter-
organizational collaboration.  The law enforcement sample includes agencies from small, 
medium, and large municipalities, county sheriffs, and state police.  Furthermore, 41 states 
(including the District of Columbia) with geographic distribution across the five regions of the 
U.S. are represented in the sample.  The fusion center sample is even more generalizable as each 
operational fusion center in the U.S. at the time of the survey is represented.  These fusion 
centers represent at least one major center from each state and multiple regional centers.  
Summaries of respondents from both samples are provided below.  
Table 1 displays descriptive information for the state and local law enforcement agencies 
represented in the current study.  Personnel data was captured from the Uniform Crime Report 
Police Employee Data from the same year the survey was administered.  The median agency size 
is 276 total sworn and non-sworn personnel while the majority of agencies were located in the 
Midwest region of the United States, followed closely by the Southeast and Northwest.  
Respondents are mostly investigators and administrators who have been employed by their 
agency for more than 15 years.   
 
[ Table 1 approximately here ] 
 
Table 2 displays descriptive information of the fusion centers represented in the current 
study.  The majority (52%) of the fusion centers in the sample consider their center to focus on 
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“all-crimes, all-threats, all-hazards” – implying a diverse set of intelligence-related operations 
which go beyond the scope of terrorism.  Most of the fusion centers became operational within 
six years of the study being conducted (66%).  Administrators and supervisors were the two 
predominant positions identified by respondents – as expected given upper-level management 
were typically selected to represent the fusion center at the conference.  Lastly, most respondents 
(41%) indicated they had been assigned to their fusion center for one to three years at the time of 
being surveyed.  This is not outside the norm given the nature of turn-over within fusion centers 
as agencies rotate assigned personnel.  In the case of newly assigned personnel, having only been 
assigned to the fusion center for one to three years may not be indicative of a lack of knowledge 
since personnel assigned to the fusion center are typically chosen by the individual’s experience 
in intelligence operations.   
 
[ Table 2 approximately here ] 
 
Findings 
The present research utilizes a range of descriptive statistics to illustrate the extent to 
which inter-organizational relationships and collaboration exist across different types of law 
enforcement agencies and public and private organizations.  Response categories represented by 
percentages are included in the first note below each table.  Where applicable, comparisons are 
drawn from the fusion center respondents to the law enforcement respondents.  There is an 
absence of consensus among scholars regarding the conceptualization of intelligence practices 
beyond the generally agreed upon notion that such practices should include inter-organizational 
relationships, the sharing and analysis of information, and a rather ambiguous awareness of 
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threats.  Given this lack of clear conceptual guidance as well as little empirical evidence within 
the literature, no inferential modeling was constructed for the current study.  Findings from both 
the law enforcement sample and the fusion center sample are discussed in parallel rather than 
separating the findings across samples.  This organizational approach is believed to best illustrate 
the issues being presented.   
 
Relationships among Law Enforcement Agencies and other Organizations 
The relationships law enforcement organizations have among themselves and other 
community organizations is critical to the success of information sharing.  If relationships are 
poor, or non-existent, active engagement among those organizations that have information and 
those who need it is unlikely to occur.  Tables 3 and 4 are provided to illustrate the extent of 
relationships law enforcement and fusion centers have with other organizations across multiple 
sectors.  From a knowledge development perspective, with so little known with regard to these 
relationships, the findings presented here are comprehensive. As there is a multitude of 
information provided, the most important findings and trends across these relationship contexts 
are discussed.  An item-by-item discussion would not enhance the intent of this research.  
Table 3 illustrates the proximity of working relationships between multiple organizations.  
To be clear, this is a measure of professional rapport proximity, not geographic proximity.  For 
both the fusion center and law enforcement samples, the closest relationships existed among 
federal, state, and local law enforcement organizations.  Both samples also indicated a lack of 
relationships with tribal law enforcement. Not surprisingly, fusion centers indicated having 
closer relationships with more organizations as compared to the law enforcement sample.  The 
largest differences in these relationships, in terms of percentages, were with other state fusion 
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centers (80.2% fusion center, 38.6% law enforcement), the Department of Homeland Security 
(82.3% fusion center, 55.7% law enforcement), critical infrastructure (75.0% fusion center, 
42.6% law enforcement), and the National Guard (72.9% fusion center, 44.6% law enforcement).  
These findings are consistent with how fusion centers are defined and structured as they should 
have closer relationships with these federal and other state entities than traditional law 
enforcement agencies.   
Interestingly, the law enforcement sample indicated having closer relationships with 
hospitals.  Though it cannot be said for certain, this is likely a result of cooperation in the event 
of violent crimes and victim services (such as investigations of sexual assault or shootings), not 
necessarily terrorism or threat related.  The proximity of these relationships across position type 
within the law enforcement sample was closest among administrators and investigators.  This is 
likely a result of administrators forging these relationships for operational and political reasons 
as well as investigators cooperating with these organizations for purposes of gathering evidence 
and information to clear crimes.  Worth noting is that none of these relationship differences were 
statistically significant; lending hope that law enforcement agencies have relationships close 
enough to meet their operational needs.   
 
[ Table 3 approximately here ] 
 
Table 4 presents the results on respondents’ perception of their organization’s satisfaction 
with other organizations.  These results are insightful, especially when contrasted with the 
previously discussed findings.  Generally, only a modest number of law enforcement and fusion 
center respondents were very satisfied with their relationship with the organizations noted and 
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there was not much variation when comparing the two samples.  For example, approximately 20 
percent of law enforcement and fusion center respondents were very satisfied with their 
relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, other federal law enforcement agencies, 
and emergency management personnel.  A somewhat higher percentage of both sample 
respondents were very satisfied with their relationship with state and local law enforcement 
agencies.  Approximately 28 percent of law enforcement respondents and 34 percent of the 
fusion center respondents were very satisfied with their relationship with state law enforcement 
agencies, and over 38 percent of the law enforcement and fusion center respondents indicated 
they were very satisfied with their relationship with local law enforcement agencies.   
Consistent (and thus not surprising) with the finding of relationship proximity, both 
sample respondents were not very satisfied with their relationship with tribal law enforcement, 
public health, and private sector agencies.  These low responses are possibly linked to a lack of 
interaction with these agencies rather than specific concerns about these relationships.  There 
was some variation in satisfaction with relationships when comparing across positions in the law 
enforcement sample.  For example, supervisors, investigators, and analysts were less satisfied 
with their relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation compared to administrators in the 
sample.  Supervisors and investigators were less satisfied with their relationship with other 
federal law enforcement compared to administrators and analysts.  Supervisors, investigators, 
and analysts were also less likely to be satisfied with their relationship with local law 
enforcement, public health agencies, and emergency management agencies.   
 
[ Table 4 approximately here ] 
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Inter-Organizational Information Sharing 
Relationships are built to facilitate mutual benefit.  In the context of the current 
discussion, relationships are needed to share information from disparate sources to prevent or 
mitigate threats and crimes.  This aspect of relationships can be captured by exploring the extent 
to which agencies provide intelligence to, and receive intelligence from, outside agencies.  Table 
5 displays the extent to which organizations provide and receive intelligence from external 
organizations either very frequently or frequently.  Similar to the findings of relationship 
proximity, both the fusion center and law enforcement samples indicated they most frequently 
provided intelligence to, and received intelligence from, state and local law enforcement 
agencies.  Both samples also indicated providing intelligence least to tribal law enforcement and 
receiving information least from critical infrastructure and the National Drug Intelligence Center. 
Drawing inferences with respect to providing intelligence, fusion centers provided intelligence to 
state and tribal law enforcement as well as state government officials and the department of 
corrections more frequently than the law enforcement sample.  With respect to receiving 
intelligence, fusion centers received intelligence from other state fusion centers, Immigrations 
and Customs Enforcement, and the Coast Guard significantly more than law enforcement.  These 
findings are promising as they continue to be consistent with the conceptual design of fusion 
centers.   
 
[ Table 5 approximately here ] 
 
Table 6 presents the perceived usefulness of sources of information.  Small differences 
existed across the fusion center and law enforcement samples with regard to perceived 
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usefulness of information for terrorism-related activity.  The law enforcement sample indicated 
information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (75.7%) and its Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(74.8%), the Department of Homeland Security (72.8%), and other federal agencies (71.3%) as 
the most useful sources of information.  The law enforcement sample also indicated the Attorney 
General’s Anti-Terrorism Task Force (35.1%), Department of Defense (34.5%), and private 
sector (35.7%) as the least useful sources of information.   
Conversely, the fusion center sample indicated the Department of Homeland Security 
(83.3%), other federal law enforcement agencies (82.3%), other state fusion centers (84.4%), 
scholarly publications (82.3%), and professional publications (82.3%) as the most useful sources 
of terrorism-related information.  Fusion center respondents indicated state offices of homeland 
security and local law enforcement agencies to be the least useful sources of information.  This is 
not surprising as the vast majority of local law enforcement agencies have little, if any, terrorism 
information to provide fusion centers.  The role local law enforcement maintain in counter-
terrorism is largely the collection of raw information that is then pushed along to fusion centers 
and integrated into the information sharing environment – they are not originating sources of 
terrorism-specific information.  Fusion centers indicated that information received from the Joint 
Terrorism Task Force, other state fusion centers, and state law enforcement agencies were 
significantly more useful as compared to the law enforcement sample.  
 
[ Table 6 approximately here ] 
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Preparedness 
Preparedness for purposes of prevention, mitigation, and response to terrorism and crime 
is at the heart of law enforcement information sharing relationships.  Table 7 illustrates the extent 
to which agencies perceive their preparedness.  The findings are informative.  The first two items 
focused on understanding the threats existing in their region as well as their agency’s preparation 
in responding to these threats.  A majority (63.5%) of the law enforcement respondents thought 
their agencies were either very aware or aware of the threats facing their region with little 
variation when comparing the responses by position within the agency.  In contrast, a 
significantly higher percentage of the fusion center respondents (over 94%) indicated they were 
very aware or aware of such threats facing their region.  This finding is intuitive given the role of 
fusion centers within the greater law enforcement intelligence landscape as they are structured to 
serve as a lynchpin for information sharing and analysis.  Fusion centers are tasked with the 
responsibility of identifying regional threats and facilitating awareness of potential threats to 
their law enforcement peers; thus this is a welcomed finding.   
Similarly, nearly 43 percent of the law enforcement respondents stated their agency was 
very prepared or prepared for threats in their region, but a significantly higher percentage (over 
67%) of the fusion center respondents indicated they were very prepared or prepared for 
homeland security threats.  In addition, when comparing the law enforcement responses by 
position in the organization, the responding analysts were much more likely to say that the 
organization was very prepared or prepared (66% of analysts compared to the second most 
frequent which was 46% of administrators).  Thus, although the fusion center respondents and 
analysts thought that their agencies were prepared for the threats in their region; other law 
enforcement personnel did not feel as strongly about the extent of their agency’s preparedness.  
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Results in table 7 also illustrate widespread agreement that the law enforcement 
community is far from developing a comprehensive intelligence capacity.  Less than 10 percent 
of the law enforcement respondents perceived their agency was far along in developing and 
maintaining a law enforcement intelligence capacity, 13 percent strongly agreed they had the 
capacity to identify the characteristics of events that represent the indicators or precursors of 
threats, and only 17 percent thought their agency provides actionable intelligence in a timely 
manner.  Similarly, just 15 percent of fusion center respondents believed they were very far 
along in developing and maintaining an intelligence capacity, 19 percent strongly agreed they 
had the capacity to identify the characteristics of events that represent indicators and/or 
precursors of threats, and nearly 18 percent strongly agreed the fusion center provides 
intelligence in a timely manner.   
The findings from the fusion center sample are more telling as these organizations are 
specifically tasked with these objectives and it appears personnel working within these centers 
feel they are not meeting desired ends.  Not surprising, very few respondents from either sample 
believed they had a sufficient number of staff to achieve their organization’s intelligence 
mission.  Lastly, less than 17 percent of law enforcement respondents reported fusion center 
products provided content to aid in the prevention of crime.  Though it cannot be said for certain 
due to the lack of baseline comparison data across the same metrics, these responses suggest 
increased awareness and preparedness since 9/11, but considerable work remains in building law 
enforcement intelligence capabilities.   
 
[ Table 7 approximately here ] 
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 Conclusions 
 State and local law enforcement and fusion centers appear to be making positive progress 
towards forming relationships with external organizations for purposes of sharing information; 
although significant room remains for improvement.  Trends identified in the descriptive data 
illustrate that the state and local law enforcement sample indicated strongest relationships among 
peer law enforcement agencies.  This is not surprising, nor alarming.  For purposes of crime and 
threat prevention, law enforcement is best served having strongest relationships with other law 
enforcement entities.  However, the process of achieving their desired mission – to prevent and 
mitigate crimes and threats – can only be enhanced through progress in building relationships 
with organizations not traditionally viewed as having a policing function; such as private sector 
business and public health.  For most agencies, the potential to develop such relationships is 
through an intelligence liaison officer program in which dedicated officers serve as a point of 
contact for two-way information flow.  
Trends among fusion center respondents were consistent with the concept of fusion 
centers – a welcomed finding.  Overall, fusion centers had closer and more diverse relationships 
with external organizations as compared to state and local law enforcement.  These centers are 
charged with the responsibility of receiving, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence across 
sectors and jurisdictions.  The successes illustrated by the data have likely been improved upon 
across the network of fusion centers since the data were collected.  A recently published report 
from the Committee on Homeland Security of the U.S. House of Representatives (2013) 
acknowledged dramatic improvements in the sharing of intelligence directly resulting from 
fusion center activities highlighted in these findings.   
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 As mentioned, there has been little empirical exploration of these relationships and to 
best provide context for the findings presented here they are discussed in comparison to previous 
works.  Though no study has yet to examine law enforcement information sharing relationships 
with non-law enforcement organizations, the findings presented here are largely consistent with 
information currently known about local law enforcement perceptions of fusion centers.  In their 
study of local South Carolina law enforcement and the South Carolina Intelligence and 
Information Center, Cooney et al. (2011) found more than 80 percent of local law enforcement 
perceived the fusion center to be useful; compared to approximately 66 percent in the current 
study.  The South Carolina study also found that 86 percent of local law enforcement sampled 
did not submit information to the center whereas 30 percent of local law enforcement reported 
sending information to fusion centers in the current study.   
In a survey of New Jersey State Police troopers, Ratcliffe and Walden (2010) found 
approximately half of the state law enforcement sampled perceived information received from 
other state and local law enforcement more useful than information received from the fusion 
center.  This finding is also true in the current study, though local law enforcement perceived 
information from state agencies (69.9%) to be slightly more useful as compared to information 
from the fusion center (66.7%).  This less dramatic difference found in the present study is likely 
an artifact of the survey population which was taken from individuals specifically working 
intelligence operations versus general law enforcement responsibilities.  The findings presented 
here are distinguishable from those discussed as they are drawn from a national sample of 
multiple agencies and are not reflective of information sharing within a single state.    
Future research in this area would benefit from more information surrounding the 
intricacies of these relationships.  For example, the majority of fusion center and law 
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enforcement respondents indicated a close relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
as well as the perception that their information was useful.  However, very few respondents 
indicated they were satisfied with their relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  
Improved measures, such as quantity and quality of terrorism training attended, specific types of 
personnel within the agency, and more detailed information as to why agencies were satisfied or 
not, close or not, and engaged in information sharing or not with other organizations, would help 
contextualize the findings presented.   
Moreover, geographic proximity would also be insightful.  Despite leaps in 
telecommunications and internet-based communications, the ability to meet face-to-face on a 
consistent basis for purposes of sharing information could perhaps enhance a number of 
relationships metrics such as satisfaction and perceived usefulness.  Geographic proximity is also 
relevant for developing professional rapport and trust among law enforcement and non-law 
enforcement entities for sharing information.  For example, research on strengthening 
relationships between police and police researchers has shown that police practitioners preferred 
working with researchers located in or near their community and that such proximity facilitated 
higher-level interaction between the two groups (Alpert, Rojek and Hansen 2009).  Data utilized 
for the present study would allow for exploration within geographic region; however such an 
exploration would provide little insight to inform actionable improvement of relationships.  
Improved metrics could also inform the sustainability of such relationships. It seems 
reasonable to assume that agencies or organizations that perceive the information received from 
other organizations to be useful, or relationships that are satisfactory, would be indicative of 
efforts worth sustaining.  Furthermore, consistent across all the findings was a lack of 
participation with tribal law enforcement entities.  Though their law enforcement footprint is 
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relatively small, their land sizes are significant and the location of many of these tribal areas is of 
interest to public safety in the southwest U.S. where issues related to border crossing are most 
frequent.  In other areas of the U.S., the tribal role in the gambling industry (tribal casinos) is 
likely to have implications for terrorism planning and possible money laundering.  Scholars and 
professionals alike should explore ways to bring tribal partners to the table in a more effective 
manner.  Again, these relationships are likely poor as a result of geographic proximity.  Despite 
some measurement shortcoming with regard to specificity, the findings presented are insightful 
and present an empirical foundation for future research to be developed. 
 
 
 
Notes 
1. This research was sponsored by grant award number 2008-IJ-CX-0007 from the National 
Institute of Justice, US Department of Justice.  Points of view or opinions expressed are those of 
the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the National Institute of 
Justice or the US Department of Justice. 
2. For a comprehensive discussion of the differences of these types of intelligence see: Carter, 
David L. 2012. Law Enforcement Intelligence and National Security Intelligence: Exploring the 
Differences. International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts Journal, 21(1): 
1-14.  
3. Grant award number 2008-IJ-CX-0007.   
4. This training program was primarily attended by intelligence personnel from state and local 
law enforcement agencies.  Personnel attending the training were typically senior-level 
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intelligence personnel as well as intelligence analysts.  The trainings were held in cities across 
the United States with no geographic bias as the intent of the program was to develop and 
enhance an intelligence capability among state and local agencies nationwide.  This training 
lasted two-and-a-half days and was delivered free of charge to participants.  The Department of 
Homeland Security covered all training costs.  
5. Attendees of the National Fusion Center Conferences were primarily administrators and senior 
personnel (i.e. Director, Deputy Director, Senior Analyst).  These meetings were purposely held 
outside of the Washington, DC area to further facilitate an emphasis on the state and local 
components of fusion centers.  The 2007 conference was held in Destin, Florida and San 
Francisco, California held the conference in 2008.  Attendees were responsible for their own 
costs to attend; however these costs were allowable expenses under state homeland security 
funds and enabled representation of multiple persons from each fusion center.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Law Enforcement Sample Descriptives (n = 345) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Median (Mean) 
Agency Size 276 (1341)  
 
 Valid Percent (n) 
Respondent’s Position 
          Administrator 
          Supervisor 
          Investigator 
          Analyst 
 
29% (100) 
23% (81) 
32% (110) 
16% (54) 
Respondent Years at Agency 
          Less than 1 Year 
          1-3 Years 
          4-9 Years 
          10-15 Years 
          More than 15 Years 
 
0.3% (1) 
06% (20) 
18% (64) 
21% (73) 
55% (187)  
Agency Region 
          Northeast 
          Southeast 
          Midwest 
          Southwest 
          West 
 
22% (77) 
23% (80) 
27% (91) 
11% (37) 
17% (60) 
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Table 2. Fusion Center Sample Descriptives (n = 96) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Valid Percent(n) 
Respondent’s Position 
          Administrator 
          Supervisor 
          Investigator 
          Analyst 
Not Specified 
 
51% (49) 
20% (19) 
8% (7) 
10% (10) 
11% (11) 
Respondent Years at Fusion Center 
          Less than 1 Year 
          1-3 Years 
          4-9 Years 
          10-15 Years 
          More than 15 Years 
Not Specified 
Focus of Fusion Center 
 
10% (10) 
41% (39) 
27% (26) 
3% (3) 
2%  (2) 
17% (16) 
 
Terrorism Only 5% (5) 
“All-Crimes” 29% (28) 
“All-Crimes, All-threats, All-Hazards” 52% (50) 
Not Specified 14% (13) 
Age of Fusion Center 
1-3 Years 
4-6 Years 
7 or More Years 
Not Specified 
 
39% (36) 
27% (26) 
17% (16) 
17% (16) 
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Table 3. Proximity of Working Relationships1 
Organization Fusion Center2 
Law 
Enforcement3 Administrator
4 Supervisor4 Investigator4 Analyst4 
 
Federal Bureau 
Investigation 
76.0% 
(73) 
72.5% 
(250) 
25.1% 
(83)  
16.0% 
(53) 
22.4% 
(74) 
10.3% 
(34)  
Federal Law 
Enforcement 
80.2% 
(77) 
79.1% 
(273) 
25.7% 
(85) 
17.2% 
(57) 
26.3% 
(87) 
12.1% 
(40)  
State Law 
Enforcement 
84.4% 
(81) 
86.7% 
(299) 
26.9% 
(89) 
20.5% 
(68) 
28.7% 
(95) 
12.4% 
(41)  
Local Law 
Enforcement 
80.2% 
(77) 
86.4% 
(298) 
26.0% 
(86) 
21.8% 
(72) 
27.5% 
(91) 
12.7% 
(42)  
Tribal Law 
Enforcement 
30.2% 
(29) 
20.6% 
(71) 
4.5% 
(15) 
4.8% 
(16) 
6.9% 
(23) 
4.8% 
(16)  
State Fusion 
Center NA 
58.0% 
(200) 
18.7% 
(62) 
13.9% 
(46) 
18.7% 
(62) 
8.2% 
(27) 
Other State Fusion 
Center 
80.2% 
(77) 
38.6% 
(100) 
10.9% 
(36) 
7.6% 
(25) 
14.2% 
(47) 
7.3% 
(24) 
State Government 
Officials  
74.0% 
(71) 
48.7% 
(168) 
17.5% 
(58) 
11.2% 
(27) 
16.0% 
(53) 
5.7% 
(19) 
Critical 
Infrastructure  
75.0% 
(72) 
42.6% 
(147) 
14.8% 
(49) 
11.5% 
(38) 
12.1% 
(40) 
5.7% 
(19) 
Dept of 
Corrections 
68.8% 
(66) 
60.9% 
(210) 
17.5% 
(58) 
14.2% 
(47) 
21.8% 
(72) 
8.8% 
(29) 
Emergency 
Management  
78.1% 
(75) 
69.9% 
(241) 
23.3% 
(77) 
17.2% 
(57) 
21.5% 
(71) 
9.5% 
(31) 
Fire  62.5% (61) 
64.3% 
(222) 
21.1% 
(70) 
15.4% 
(51) 
21.1% 
(70) 
7.9% 
(26) 
Homeland 
Security 
82.3% 
(79) 
55.7% 
(192) 
19.6% 
(65) 
14.2% 
(47) 
16.0% 
(53) 
7.6% 
(25) 
Internal Revenue 
Service 
44.8% 
(43) 
33.6% 
(116) 
12.4% 
(41) 
7.3% 
(24) 
10.6% 
(35) 
4.5% 
(15) 
Hospitals 51.0% (49) 
57.1% 
(197) 
20.8% 
(69) 
14.2% 
(47) 
17.8% 
(59) 
5.4% 
(18) 
Private Sector 61.5% (59) 
45.8% 
(158) 
17.5% 
(58) 
11.2% 
(37) 
13.6% 
(45) 
4.8% 
(16) 
Public Health 
Agencies 
65.6% 
(63) 
55.4% 
(191) 
19.3% 
(64) 
14.5% 
(48) 
17.2% 
(57) 
5.4% 
(18) 
Public Works 52.1% (50) 
60.9% 
(210) 
21.8% 
(72) 
14.5% 
(48) 
19.0% 
(63) 
6.0% 
(20) 
Transportation  65.6% (63) 
52.5% 
(181) 
19.0% 
(63) 
13.3% 
(44) 
14.8% 
(49) 
6.0% 
(20) 
National Guard 72.9% (70) 
44.6% 
(154) 
15.7% 
(52) 
9.1% 
(30) 
13.9% 
(46) 
6.6. % 
(22) 
1Very Close/Somewhat Close; 2n = 96; 3n = 345; 4Law enforcement sample 
*.001, **.05 
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Table 4. Satisfaction with Information Sharing Relationships1 
Organization Fusion Center2 
Law 
Enforcement3 Administrator
4 Supervisor4 Investigator4 Analyst4 
 
Federal Bureau 
Investigation 
 
19.8% 
(19) 
 
 
20.6% 
(71) 
 
 
28.7% 
(99) 
 
 
18.3% 
(63) 
 
 
15.7% 
(54) 
 
 
16.8% 
(58) 
 
Federal Law 
Enforcement 
 
18.8% 
(18) 
 
16.5% 
(57) 
 
21.7% 
(75) 
 
 
9.0% 
(31) 
 
12.5% 
(43) 
 
20.0% 
(69) 
 
 
State Fusion 
Center 
 
NA 
 
 
22.3% 
(77) 
 
 
24.1% 
(83) 
 
 
18.8% 
(65) 
 
 
22.0% 
(76) 
 
25.8% 
(89) 
 
State Law 
Enforcement 
34.4% 
(33) 
 
27.8% 
(96) 
 
 
29.9% 
(103) 
 
 
29.0% 
(100) 
 
 
22.0% 
(76) 
 
 
34.8% 
(120) 
 
 
Local Law 
Enforcement 
 
38.5% 
(37) 
 
 
38.0% 
(131) 
 
 
44.3% 
(153) 
 
 
32.8% 
(113) 
 
 
36.5% 
(124) 
 
 
36.8% 
(127) 
 
 
Tribal Law 
Enforcement 
 
4.2% 
(4) 
 
 
4.9% 
(17) 
 
 
6.1% 
(21) 
 
 
1.2% 
(4) 
 
 
2.6% 
(9) 
 
 
11.0% 
(38) 
 
Private Sector 
 
10.4% 
(10) 
 
 
7.0% 
(24) 
 
 
9.3% 
(32) 
 
 
8.4% 
(29) 
 
 
4.6% 
(16) 
 
 
6.1% 
(21) 
 
Public Health 
 
15.6% 
(15) 
 
 
9.6% 
(33) 
 
 
18.6% 
(64) 
 
 
4.9% 
(17) 
 
 
6.4% 
(22) 
 
 
6.1% 
(21) 
 
Emergency 
Management 
 
22.9% 
(22) 
 
 
17.7% 
(61) 
 
 
29.9% 
(103) 
 
 
9.6% 
(33) 
 
 
14.8% 
(51) 
 
 
11.0% 
(38) 
 
1 Very Satisfied, 2n = 96; 3n = 345; 4Law enforcement sample 
*.001, **.05 
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Table 5. Intelligence Sharing with External Organizations1 
Intelligence Provided to  
External Organizations 
Intelligence Received from  
External Organizations 
Organization Fusion Center 2 
Law 
Enforcement 3 Organization 
Fusion 
Center 2 
Law 
Enforcement 3 
 
Federal Bureau 
Investigation 
56.3% 
(54) 
33.6% 
(116) 
Federal Bureau 
Investigation 
39.6% 
(38) 
34.5% 
(119) 
Federal Law 
Enforcement 
49.0% 
(47) 
38.8% 
(134) 
Drug Enforcement 
Admin 
28.1% 
(27) 
28.4% 
(98) 
State Law 
Enforcement 
69.8%** 
(67) 
48.4% 
(167) 
State Law 
Enforcement 
62.5% 
(60) 
40.3% 
(139) 
Local Law 
Enforcement 
64.6% 
(62) 
55.4% 
(191) 
Local Law 
Enforcement 
45.8% 
(44) 
33.0% 
(114) 
Tribal Law 
Enforcement 
16.7% 
(16)** 
10.1% 
(35) Sheriff 
59.4% 
(57) 
48.1% 
(166) 
State Fusion 
Center NA 
30.1% 
(104) State Fusion Center NA 
40.0% 
(138) 
Other State Fusion 
Center 
51.0% 
(49) 
19.7% 
(68) 
Other State Fusion 
Center 
60.4%** 
(58) 
23.8% 
(82) 
State Govt 
Officials  
42.7%** 
(41) 
21.2% 
(73) 
State Attorney 
General  
20.8%** 
(20) 
18.3% 
(63) 
Critical 
Infrastructure  
45.8% 
(44) 
22.0% 
(76) Critical Infrastructure  
33.3% 
(32) 
15.7% 
(54) 
Dept of 
Corrections 
45.8%** 
(44) 
30.4% 
(105) Dept of Corrections 
46.9% 
(45) 
31.0% 
(107) 
Emergency 
Management  
49.0% 
(47) 
30.7% 
(106) Border Patrol 
19.8% 
(19) 
16.8% 
(58) 
Fire  40.6% (39) 
25.5% 
(88) Fire  
24.0% 
(23) 
28.1% 
(97) 
Homeland Security 55.2% (53) 
27.2% 
(94) Homeland Security 
45.8% 
(44) 
34.5% 
(119) 
Internal Revenue 
Service 
21.9% 
(21) 
12.8% 
(44) 
Immigration and 
Customs 
Enforcement 
30.2%** 
(29) 
26.4% 
(91) 
Hospitals 16.7% (16) 
18.3% 
(63) US Attorney’s Office 
28.1% 
(27) 
19.1% 
(66) 
Private Sector 29.2% (28) 
15.5% 
(53) Private Sector 
26.0% 
(25) 
18.8% 
(65) 
Public Health 
Agencies 
33.3% 
(32) 
18.0% 
62) 
Public Health 
Agencies 
29.2% 
(28) 
14.5% 
(50) 
Public Works 18.8% (18) 
21.4% 
(74) 
National Drug 
Intelligence Center  
20.8% 
(20) 
10.7% 
(37) 
Transportation  38.5% (37) 
20.0% 
(69) Coast Guard 
24.0%** 
(23) 
12.2% 
(42) 
National Guard 45.8% (44) 
17.1% 
(59) National Guard 
34.4% 
(33) 
12.5% 
(43) 
1Very Frequently/Frequently 2n = 96; 3n = 345;  
*.001, **.05 
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Table 6. Usefulness of Information Sources1 
Organization Fusion Center 2 Law Enforcement 3 
 
Federal Bureau Investigation 
75.0% 
(72) 
75.7% 
(261) 
FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force 75.0%** (72) 
74.8% 
(258) 
Department of Homeland Security 82.3% (79)  
72.8% 
(251) 
Other Federal Agencies 82.3% (79) 
71.3% 
(246) 
State Fusion Center NA 66.7% (230) 
Other State Fusion Center 84.4%** (81) 
60.3% 
(208) 
State Law Enforcement 72.9%** (70) 
69.9% 
(241) 
Local Law Enforcement 40.6% (39) 
57.7% 
(199) 
State Office of Homeland Security 28.1% (27) 
45.8% 
(158) 
Attorney General Anti-Terrorism Task Force 80.2% (77) 
35.1% 
(121) 
Department of Defense  50.0% (48) 
34.5% 
(119) 
Terrorism Early Warning Group  74.0% (71) 
40.0% 
(138) 
Books, Articles, Scholarly Materials 82.3% (79) 
56.2% 
(194) 
Professional Law Enforcement Publications 82.3% (79) 
62.6% 
(216) 
Open Sources 53.1% (51) 
70.4% 
(243) 
Private Sector  53.1% (51) 
35.7% 
(123) 
1Very Useful/Useful 2n = 96; 3n = 345;  
*.001, **.05 
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Table 7. Perceptions of Preparedness  
Question Fusion Center5 
Law 
Enforcement6 Administration
7 Supervisor7 Investigator7 Analyst7 
Aware of  
threats1 
 
93.8%* 
(90) 
 
 
63.5% 
(219) 
 
 
6.9% 
(238) 
 
 
63.2% 
(218) 
 
 
57.4% 
(198) 
 
 
70.4% 
(243) 
 
Prepared for 
threats2 
 
67.7%* 
(65) 
 
 
42.6% 
(147) 
 
 
46.1% 
(159) 
 
 
32.5% 
(112) 
 
 
35.7% 
(123) 
 
 
66.1% 
(228) 
 
Far along in 
developing 
intelligence 
capacity3 
 
14.6%* 
(14) 
 
 
9.3% 
(32) 
 
 
 
8.4% 
(29) 
 
 
 
6.7% 
(23) 
 
 
 
7.0% 
(24) 
 
 
 
16.5% 
(57) 
 
Sufficient 
staff4 
 
1.0%** 
(1) 
 
 
2.9% 
(10) 
 
 
1.4% 
(5) 
 
 
1.2% 
(4) 
 
 
4.1% 
(14) 
 
 
2.9% 
(10) 
 
Can identify 
threats4 
 
18.8%* 
(18) 
 
 
13.3% 
(46) 
 
 
14.5% 
(50) 
 
 
16.8% 
(58) 
 
 
7.2% 
(25) 
 
 
18.6% 
(64) 
 
Provide 
timely intell4 
 
17.7%* 
(17) 
 
 
16.8% 
(58) 
 
 
16.5% 
(57) 
 
 
19.1% 
(66) 
 
 
12.8% 
(44) 
 
 
24.1% 
(83) 
 
Fusion center 
products aid 
crime 
prevention4 
NA 
 
16.8% 
(58) 
 
 
17.7% 
(61) 
 
 
20.0% 
(69) 
 
 
12.8% 
(44) 
 
 
18.0% 
(62) 
 
1 Very aware/aware; 2 Very prepared/prepared; 3 Very far; 4 Strongly Agree; 5n = 96; 6n = 345; 7Law enforcement 
sample 
*.001, **.05 
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